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Gramsci's Views on
Consent and Its Basis as
An Alternate Political Route

Michael J. Eula

It seems safe to assume that the traditional view of consent
has followed one of two broad paths in Western thought. The
first perspective portrays consent as an unexamined assumption;
it is a voluntary act of political participation on the part of rational
individuals in liberal society. These people, through their acceptance of the State, constitute civil society. Another view of consent
found in the traditional literature focuses on an absence of voluntary participation, and instead, stresses the reality of State force
via legislation, the National Guard, and any other tool of coercion.
Thus, the dichotomy remains clear-consent either rests upon the
voluntary participation of atomized individuals, or it is forced
upon the populace through the coercive power of the State.
Gramsci, however, provides a far more subtle view of consent via
the hegemonic principle of strategic political leadership, a tenet
which is not reducible to naked State power, assertions of mass
acceptance, or even mere socialization. In the process, Gramsci
offers the possibility of an alternate road to socialism in Western
society.
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Gramsci' s conception of consent is multi-faceted and quite
complex; unlike the traditional presentations, it does not isolate
a particular kind of consensus which serves to reproduce a social
system and hence, provide for voluntary participation. Instead,
Gramsci offers a two-dimensional model of consent which can be
categorized as passive/indirect or active/direct. 1 In the first instance, he is referring to those historical moments in which
changes are instituted regardless of popular wishes. This is not
the same as crude State coercion, however, for Gramsci defines
the State as "the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains
its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those
over whom it rules .... " 2 Thus, Gramsci is presenting the outline
of a process in which consent is attained via a leadership not
overtly dependent on force. Voluntary participation is granted by
Gramsci, but unlike the traditional views which present voluntary
participation as an unexamined given, Gramsci explains such consent as a learned process guided by State leadership through such
institutions as the school.
In his idea of active/direct consent, Gramsci speaks of a participatory relationship between the ruling elite and the people.
At this point, Gramsci introduces us to the cornerstone of not
only consent, but further, of hegemony itself . For him, a central
feature of active/direct consent is an expansiveness which is devoid
of the bureaucratic repression evident in, say, Mussolini's Italy.
In this regard, Gramsci makes a clear distinction between workingclass leadership and bourgeois dictatorship under fascism.
Bourgeois dictatorship, Gramsci argues, is characterized by its
repressive natur e . But in the case of active /direct consent, or proletarian expansiveness, there is a groundswell of direct action
from the subordinate classes which has no need for a Stalinist
brand of revolution from above . Acquiescence under Giolittianism, which Gramsci equates with State domination through
bureaucratic centralization and authoritarian paternalism, is contrasted with the factory councils, that embodiment of democratic
producers. In an unsigned letter to L'Ordine Nuovo dated February
10, 1921, Gramsci argues for the strategic necessity of active/direct
consent:
Through the fight for control-which does not take place in Parliament, but is a revolutionary mass struggle and a propaganda and
organizational activity of the historic party of the working class,
the Communist Party-the working class must acquire, both
spiritually and as an organization, awareness of its autonomy and
historic personality. This is why the first phase of the struggle will
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present itself as the fight for a specific form of organization. This
form of organization can only be the Factory Council, and the
nationally centralized system of Factory Councils .... This struggle
must be waged in such a way as to show the great mass of the
population that all the existential problems of the present historical
period ... can be resolved only when all economic power, and
hence all political power, has passed into the hands of the working
class . . . it must be waged in such a way as to organize all the
popular forces in revolt against the capitalist regime around the
working class, so that the latter really becomes the leading class
and guides all the productive forces to emancipate themselves by
realizing the communist programme. 3

Active/direct consent, or the expansive nature of proletariat
leadership and agitation, is a democratic movement with roots in
the subordinate classes. Hegemony is, at least in this regard, an
anti-Statist force. Gramsci is markedly different from Lenin in that
the small cadre of professional revolutionaries, albeit well-suited
to the peculiarities of Russia in 1917, is replaced by a strategy
which emphasizes active consent through the self-organization of
the masses. This self-organization is to take place in the major
institutions of civil society-the school, the workplace, and the
family. Gramsci argues that such working-class assertion has as its
goal the creation of a "collective will"; a new national/popular
identity which rejects bourgeois institutions and culture. As a result, a new type of State, indeed, a new type of person, waits to be
born out of the expansive tendencies of working-class leadership.
What we see here is the creativity of Gramsci's Marxism.
While traditional Marxists up to Gramsci had relied heavily on
the notion of repressive class domination, Gramsci instead stresses
the forms of class leadership characteristic of advanced capitalist
societies. "A social group can," wrote Gramsci in Notes on Italian
History, "and indeed must, already exercise 'leadership' before
winning governmental power; it subsequently becomes dominant
when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp,
it must continue to 'lead' as well . " 4 This is probably the most
crucial area of Gramscian theory. Hegemony is not the same as
repressive force . In a society which is characterized by force
through bureaucratic repression, hegemony is more or less absent.
Hegemony, then, is not the product of forcible conquest.
Rather, it is the far more subtle result of intellectual and moral
teachings which unite various subordinate classes (i.e., the urban
working class and the peasantry) in an alliance for socialist agitation. Because there is what Gramsci terms an "intellectual and
moral reform," the working class, as the emerging hegemonic
class, is differ ent from the bourgeoisie in that the former class
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goes beyond mere material interests. In other words, the working
class goes past the point of narrow economic demands, and instead, tends to universalize its intellectual and moral teachings
from a position of leadership. This blend of economic and political
concerns becomes, through the process of leadership, the concerns
of other subordinate classes. Together, these subaltern groups
form a "historic bloc" which signifies its importance as a
hegemonic class during a slow and often painful process of revolutionary transformation. This stands in stark contrast to the
violent and elitist tendencies inherent in Leninist political strategy.
Gramsci was thus acutely aware of the necessity of developing
a fundamentally differen t approach to the implementation of
socialism; one which offered an alternative to the Leninist model.
The difference between the Gramscian road to socialism, and
Lenin's immediate seizure of the governmental apparatus at
strategic locations, lies in the relative complexity of civil society
in the West. The legacy of a comparatively autonomous civil society in the West (when compared with Tsarist absolutism), and its
diffusion of power, necessitates the prior absorption of civil society
into socialist values through political and intellectuaVcultural
leadership.
This is the struggle for the hearts and minds of the people
via one of Gramsci' s favorite military metaphors - the "war of
position. " 5 Here Gramsci argues that before the attainment of
formal political power, class struggle has to be waged in the
"trenches" of civil society. Accordingly, this battle takes place on a
wide range of fronts--educational, parliamentary, governmental,
in the church, and even in architectural design. It is a direct assault
on the political power of the bourgeoisie as that power is exercised
in civil society. Only after a decisive victory is achieved on this
level, Gramsci argues, can a "war of movement," or a frontal
assault on formal political institutions, be concluded in favor of
the working classes. 6
The contrast between these two strategic measures enables
Gramsci to disentangle the often complex web of relationships
between coercive domination and hegemonic leadership. He is
able to do this because of an insistence on grounding political
theory in specific historical locations and moments . Passive/indirect consent is seen in conjunction with the notion of "passive
revolution. " 7 By this, Gramsci refers to those historical moments
in which change is necessary in order to maintain what is there;
society therefore seems to change, but its most fundamental features nevertheless remain constant. This process is accomplished
through a revolutionary thrust above the people which is devoid
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of popular initiative. The ruling classes are thus preserved despite
sweeping ideological, political, and socio-economic changes. For
example, Gramsci examines the Italian Risorgimento, in which,
he argues, the Piedmontese State ushered in a new historical
epoch despite an absence of popular action. Consequently, the
leadership which so characterizes active /direct consent was replaced by the weight of bureaucratic oppression. As he so insightfully put it, this was a "dictatorship without hegemony." 8 The
State, in this scenario, eventually replaced the class which brought
it to power, and developed its own interests and administrative/
police apparatus.
But Gramsci's analysis is not relevant only to Piedmont. It is
equally useful in a study of Stalinism. Further, it is an indispensable tool in any historical analysis of the bourgeois monopoly of
State institutions. From this vantage point, it is plausible to argue
that twentieth-century capitalism has, at least in America, Germany, Italy, and possibly Vichy France, spawned a discernible
rearrangement of the balance between hegemony and domination.
This disequilibrium has not only revealed the crisis of bourgeois
hegemony, but furthermore, it has illustrated the steady implementation of passive revolution.
We therefore return to Gramsci's assertion that consensus
cannot be adequately comprehended unless it is rooted in an
analysis sensitive to class structure, geographic location, and specific historical moments. Hegemony cannot be analyzed as an
ahistorical concept; its very nature, and the forms which it takes,
depend totally on the class from which it emanates, and the historical context which serves to determine its many cultural forms.
To make this argument even more precise, Gramsci reminds us
that the hegemonic program of the proletariat can only be
positioned, by its own definition, against that of the bourgeoisie.
That is to say that it is only through a process of active/direct
consent that the working classes can establish themselves as an
"historic bloc" which leads through a struggle against the forces
of passive/indirect consent.
In order to make this clearer, Gramsci outlines some very
specific characteristics of both passive/indirect consent and active /
direct consent. The former is, as I have mentioned, noted for its
lack of popular initiative, along with its bureaucratic repression.
The bourgeoisie dominates through its monopolization of the
State's coercive machinery, and this class also maintains close
control of the few hegemonic channels still in operation. Finally,
passive/indirect consent is characterized by the strengthening of
a powerful State in all of its manifestations, both civil and political.

DIFFERENT/A

182

Active/direct consent is also clearly outlined by Gramsci. Not
surprisingly, the elements which constitute su'ch a social system
stand in stark contrast to the outline enumerated above. A lack
of popular initiative is replaced by direct, active consent given
direction through self-organization. Bureaucratic repression yields
to an expansive, or democratic, hegemonic leadership. The
bourgeoisie is subordina ted to the working classes. Passive revolution from above gives way to a democratic revolt initiated by
the subaltern classes. Finally, consent takes on a distinct antiStatist tone.
While these characteristics help to clear up the confusion surrounding the model of consent devised by Gramsci, it also leads
one to invert the whole scheme so as to test its strength. As I
have already pointed out, Gramsci depicted those instances in
which coercion was evident. In such cases, hegemony was by and
large absent. We are therefore justified in asking whether
hegemony can be present without the accompaniment of repression.
Gramsci, through his presentation of active/direct consent,
noted that hegemony essentially points to an anti-Statist perspective. But Gramsci also utilized the concept of hegemony in a very
different way. In his critique of those commentators who viewed
the State as a mere instrument of repression, or, in the case of
liberal writers, as a "night watchman," Gramsci spoke of an "integral" or extended State. By this, he seems to mean the combination of those forces that I have already discussed-that
complex
array of administrative and educational/theoretical
elements
which constitute the State, both political and civil. 9 As this relates
to faulty political strategy (as Gramsci argues was practiced by
the PSI), he notes that:
In politics the error occurs as a result of an inaccurate understanding
of what the State (in its integral meaning: dictatorship + hegemony)
really is. 10

Perry Anderson, in "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci,"
has argued that this dual function of hegemony reveals a fundamental contradiction in Gramscian theory. 11 This quandary is
rooted, Anderson argues, in the simultaneous role of hegemony
as both a Statist force and an anti-Statist force. But does Anderson
miss the point here? I must side with such scholars as BuciGlucksmann and argue that he does, because this alleged "contradiction" in Gramscian theory confuses the main thrust of
Gramsci's argument-that
hegemony, as a political strategy, is
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possible because of the transformation of the State within a specific
historical context. Gramsci, whether he is dealing with Italian
Fascism or Roosevelt's New Deal, is concerned with State intervention in the economy-a profound ideological abandonment of
classical liberal theory . Politics is thus presented not as a Weberian
"profession," but rather, within a framework of issues all orbiting
around a central question-how does consent become legitimate?
Gramscian theory, therefore, departs from earlier mechanistic
Marxist thought on domination. Gramsci takes a hard look at the
political results of the international monetary crisis of the 1920s
and 1930s, and attempts to explain those solutions as a bourgeois
response to the structural dysfunctions of the capitalist economy.
These solutions, whether they be the New Deal or the Blackshirts,
all tended to undermine prior notions of hegemony as it was
organized according to the classical liberal model. This vantage
point of Gramsci's enabled him to take into account a whole host
of transformations in bourgeois society-the
emergence of a
"Brain Trust" who attempted to control the cyclical tendencies
of the capitalist economy, the growth of mass political parties,
and finally, the incursion of the formal political State into previously sacrosanct areas of civil society. This is especially applicable
to the United States from the New Deal' era on; in this regard
Gramsci suggests that
It is possible to imagine the coercive element of the State withering
away by degre es, as ever-more con spicuous elements of regulated
society (or ethical State or civil society) make their appearance. 12

He goes on:
The previous ruling classes were essentially conservative in the
sense that they did not tend to construct an organic passage from
the other classes into their own, i.e., to enlarge their class sphere
"technicall y" and ideologically: their conception was that of a closed
caste. The bourgeois class poses itself as an organism in continuous
movement, capable of absorbing the entire society, assimilating it
to its own cultural and economic level. The entire function of the
State has be en transformed; the State has become an "educator,"
etc. 13

The dilemma of modern bourgeois society which Gramsci
isolates is th e tension betw een capitalist modification of the State
(passive revolution) and the liberal institutions and ideology designed for the night watchman State. Beginning with the crisis of
liberalism in postwar Italy, and moving through an analysis of
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"Fordism" (I refer here not to Gramsci' s consideration of Ford's
attempt to counter the declining rate of profit, but rather, his
company's regulation of employees' lives outside of the workplace), Gramsci deals with liberalism through an analysis of the
organization and implementation of hegemonic channels. 14 As a
result, he is able to capture the fragile nature of parliamentary
forms of government. He avoids the pitfall of simplistically criticizing the State in light of its class nature; i.e ., the bourgeois republic
is synonymous with middle-class dominance. 15 Instead, Gramsci
focuses on the ways in which the State reproduces itself in the
midst of a deep economic crisis subsequent to the First World
War. Because of this perspective, he supplies us with some possible explanations for its continued existence.
A key to this persistence is the delicate balance between consent and overt force. Gramsci isolates several factors which serve
to maintain this equilibrium. Among these are an ideology of
economic individualism, colonial expansion, and the perfection
of nationalist sentiments through universal suffrage. 16 These conditions contribute to an organized consent of the integral State
through such institutions as schools, political parties, and the
mass media.
If we consider Gramsci's views on the United States, he is
not suggesting a separation of overt force and consent (he does
not suggest this for any other parliamentary country either). The
constitutional separation of powers between the judicial, the legislative, and the executive branches is not merely a formal separation
between civil and political society. Quite the contrary-this "separation" represents the embodiment of coercive power as it is
exercised by the leading members of the bourgeoisie. While formal
political power appears to be segmented, there is, in reality, an
interpenetration of power which tends to unify and strengthen
the State. 17 Furthermore, the consent to this arrangement which
is exercised via the vote is simultaneously vulgarized by the reality
of unequal wealth throughout society. These "separate" spheres
of authority are, then, an organized center of coercion and indoctrination.
Throughout Gramsci' s analysis of consent we see his preoccupation with this balance between force and consent. We also
see his attempts to understand how this homology becomes institutionalized. He argues that this balance was seriously disrupted by the Bolshevik Revolution, imperialism, and the growth
of monopoly capitalism:
In the period

following the World War, cracks opened

up
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everywhere in the hegemonic apparatus, and the exercise of
hegemony became permanently difficult and aleatory. 18

Gramsci is speaking here of a crisis of consensus in capitalist
societies. There was a crisis of beliefs, a crisis of authority: in other
words, a weakening of the integral State . One could possibly
argue that this process is still very much with us . The balance
between consent and overt force has not been adequately recovered. As a result, the bourgeoisie has become increasingly compelled to resort to other means of consensus building, such as
authoritarian Statism, technocracy, or even fascism with a human
face. 19
Looking at hegemony from this angle, it appears to be the
possible setting for an increasingly complex socio-cultural
panorama. Maybe even more so, it is the basis for active/direct
revolution. An enlargement of the integral State means, according
to Gramsci, not simply an extension of the formal political machinery. Rather, the struggle for hegemony takes place on a wider
range of fronts. Gramsci's conception of consent goes beyond the
traditional two-sided model enumerated at the beginning of this
essay . Through his notion of the war of position, he argues that
there can be no non-Leninist transition to socialism in advanced
capitalist societies without the development of active/direct consent. His analysis is of striking importance to any historian concerned with the political meanings of popular folklore and cultural
dissent. Needles s to say, Gramsci has provided socialists in advanced capitalist societies with an alternative to the Leninist model
of revolutionary transformation. Despite the assertions of such
scholars as Walter Adamson that Marxism, as a serious political
ideology, is an anachronism, the work of Gramsci stands as an
example of its continuing applicability to the present stage of
capitalist development in the West. 20
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